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LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OR
POLITICAL DEFERRAL: AN ANALYSIS OF BRAGG V WEST
VIRGINIA COAL ASSOCIATION
CRYSTAL MOORE*
"Individual property owners should not alone be forced to
bear the cost of public policy, no matter how legitimate the interest."'
One could add to that statement that a state economy should
not have to bear the burdens of public policy. Or should it? West
Virginia currently faces such a dilemma. In Bragg v. West Virginia
Coal Association, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit considered an action involving West Virginia citizens and
environmentalist groups who brought suit seeking to enjoin the
Director of the West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection
(Director) from issuing permits that allow coal companies to dump
the remains of mountaintop mining into West Virginia streams.3 The
plaintiffs claimed the permits violated the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 4  Coal companies
subsequently intervened at the appellate level claiming an interest in
the casei
I. BACKGROUND
Congress enacted SMCRA to "strike a balance between the
nation's interests in protecting the environment from the adverse
effects of surface coal mining and in assuring the coal supply
essential to the nation's energy requirements.",6 "SMCRA... operates
primarily on the basis of cooperative federalism, a shared federal and
state government responsibility for standard setting, funding, and
enforcement.",7 Congress executed federal guidelines for regulating
surface mining; states could either follow these federal guidelines or
. Senior Staff Member, Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law. B.A.
Pikeville College, 2000; J.D. expected 2003, University of Kentucky. The author wishes to
thank her husband and parents for their unending support.
'Stephanie Rene Timmermeyer, So You Want to Ban Mountaintop Mining? You May
Have to Put Your Money Where Your Mouth Is, 103 W.VA. L. REV. 387, 404 (2001).
2248 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002) [hereinafter
Bragg]. a3See id.
430 U.S.C. § 1201 (1977).
sSee Bragg, 248 F.3d at 275.
61d. at 288.7John D. Edgcomb, Cooperative Federalism and Environmental Protection: The
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977,58 TUL. L. REv. 299, 299 (1983).
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enact their own reulations that were as stringent or stricter than the
federal minimums. If the Secretary of the Interior approved a state's
statute, then the state gained "exclusive regulatory jurisdiction" over
the enforcement of its regulations. 9 In 1981, West Virginia became
the first state to gain exclusive jurisdiction, termed "primacy."'
0
Once a state has primacy, mining companies must obtain a
permit from that state pursuant to appropriate procedures before
commencing surface mining activities.'' The requisite permit ensures
that coal companies act in a responsible manner when engaging in
surface mining.' 2 In surface mining or mountaintop removal, coal
companies remove the top of a mountain that covers a coal seam, and
subsequently remove the coal.' 3 Afterwards, the company replaces
the removed portion of the mountain to its original location,
attempting to effectuate the mountain's original shape. Due to
expansion of the removed materials, however, excess materials
remain that cannot be returned to the mountain. 14  These excess
materials, termed "overburden," are then placed in nearby valleys, or
valley fills.' 5
This form of coal mining presents obvious hazards to the
environment. Many argue that the process negatively affects the
aesthetic value of the mountain.' 6  Perhaps the more serious and
controversial environmental issue is the effect that surface mining has
on valleys and the streams that flow through them. 7 The latter of
these two issues is the primary reason that the plaintiffs in Bragg
brought their action.t8 Valley fills are produced when companies
dump overburden into streams. When rain mixes with overburden in
valley fills, chemicals are created which cause environmental
damage. Through erosion and flooding, these chemical deposits
negatively affect the oxygen levels of streams and greatly harm plant
life and the environment as a whole. ' 9
'Bragg, 248 F.3d at 288.
91d.
'°Timmermeyer, supra note 1, at 391.
"30 U.S.C. § 1256(a) (1977).
2Charles Saffer, An Overview of the Ownership and Control Rule Under the West
Virginia Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act, 100 W.VA. L. REv. 741, 741 (1998).
'3Timmermeyer, supra note 1 at 390.
141d.
"Id.; see also Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286.
'Timmerneyer, supra note I.
"See generally id.
"Bragg, 248 F.3d at 286-87.
19Edgcomb, supra note 7, at 303 (explaining how surface mining valley fills causes




Surface mining does have positive attributes-specifically a
substantial economic effect in West Virginia20 and its crucial
contribution to the nation's energy supply.2 1  In 1995, the West
Virginia coal industry exported two billion dollars worth of coal and
employed close to 20,000 people.22 Three percent of the total jobs in
West Virginia were in the coal industry in 1999.23 In addition, the
number of people the coal industry directly employs does not reflect
the numerous occupations in the state that are indirectly connected to
the coal industry. For instance, a substantial number of small
businesses depend heavily on the patronage of the well-paid miners.
The coal industry has a huge impact upon the railroad and mechanical
industries, as these two industries provide valuable services to coal
mining operations. Other positive attributes that coal companies
emphasize are the benefits of surface mining on the environment;
specific benefits include reclamation of the land, re-sowing of plant
life and the addition of ponds for fowl.
24
Coal is also an extremely important national interest.25 "The
fact that coal represents over ninety percent of our total hydrocarbon
energy reserves indicates that coal can supply a significant proportion
of our energy needs in the future., 26 "Coal generates 56 percent of
the nation's electricity' '27 with West Virginia being the second largest
generator of coal in this country.28 Thus, the state of the coal industry
in West Virginia has a great impact on the entire nation.
II. THE CASE
The conflict between the economy and the environment in
West Virginia erupted when the plaintiffs in Bragg brought suit in
federal district court claiming that the Director of the West Virginia
Division of Environmental Protection failed to follow state and
federal guidelines under SMCRA in approving surface mining
applications of coal companies that did not meet mandatory
environmental standards. 9 The Director challenged the plaintiffs'
20Saffer, supra note 12, at 741.
2'Dennis Cauchon, W. Va. Renews Historic Coal Mine War; 21" Century Battle
Fought Over Plans to Flatten Mountains, THE DETRoIT NEWS, April 18, 2000, at 2.
22Saffer, supra note 12, at 741.
3
Martha Bryson Hodel, West Virginia's Coal Industry is Alarmed by Clean- Water
Ruling; West Virginia Shaken by Strip Mine Ruling, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, October 23,
1999, at A-6.
1 Bragg, 248 F.3d 275, 286 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002).
"Cauchon, supra note 21, at 2.
26Edgcomb, supra note 7, at 301 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 98-218 (1977), reprinted in
1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593,609).
"Cauchon, supra note 2 1, at 2.
28Hodel, supra note 23, at A-6.
'9Bragg, 248 F.3d at 287.
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claims relying on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.3 ° The
Director argued that the exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment, i.e.,
Ex parte Young,31 did not apply because state law, not federal law,
was at issue.32  The parties eventually settled on several of the
plaintiffs' claims, but the district court ruled on two counts.33 These
substantive claims involved a state regulation prohibiting surface
mining within 100 feet of a stream; the plaintiffs alleged the Director
neglected to enforce this regulation by failing to make proper
findings regarding an application for surface mining permits. The
district court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, finding
that the Director must make adequate findings regarding dumping
near streams before issuing permits.35 Furthermore, the court ruled
that the Director must deny applications where there are
environmental law violations. 36 The court enjoined the Director from
issuing any additional permits that allowed coal companies to dump
overburden into streams. However, the decision was stayed pending
appeal.37
This ruling created hysteria in West Virginia. The governor
froze hiring and spending, and government agencies feared a negative
tax impact of up to $100 million. 38  The Director of the Federal
Office of Surface Mining opined that the court's decision would
negatively impact mining nationwide. 39 The industry expected the
lay-offs of at least 600 mine workers.40
The Director appealed to the Fourth Circuit the substantive
rulings of the district court judge as well as the Eleventh Amendment
issue and the subject matter jurisdiction determination.4' In addition,
several coal companies intervened on the same grounds and also
contested the court's consent decree for the settlements made between
the parties. 42  The Fourth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, since a state's Eleventh Amendment
30
Id.
"'209 U.S. 123, (1908) (holding that even if a state is protected under the Eleventh
Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity, State officials are not protected from suit for
prospective injunctive or declaratory relief to remedy ongoing violations of federal law).
32






3 Id. at 287-288.
3 Id. at 288.
3





4 Judy Jones, Budget Deal at Risk Over Coalfield Ruling; Senator Threatens to
Amend Federal Spending Measure, THE LOUISVILLE COURIER-JOURNAL, November 11, 1999,
at IA.
4 
Bragg, 248 F.3d at 288.
421d. (affirming the lower court's consent decree; ruling against the coal companies).
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The SMCRA allows private citizens to bring suit in federal
court
(1) against the United States or any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the
extent permitted by the [E]leventh [A]mendment
to the Constitution which is alleged to be in
violation of the provisions of this Act... or (2)
...where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary
or the appropriate State regulatory authority to
perform any act or duty under this Act which is
not discretionary with the Secretary or with the
appropriate State regulatory authority. 4
The Act also gives jurisdiction to the federal court system regardless
of traditional subject matter jurisdiction considerations.
45
As stated previously, SMCRA gives states a chance to obtain
primacy, or complete control over the implementation and
enforcement of their programs.46 SMCRA sets forth that "because of
the diversity in terrain, climate, biologic, chemical, and other
physical conditions in areas subject to mining operations, the primary
governmental responsibility for developing, authorizing, issuing, and
enforcing regulations for surface mining and reclamation operations
subject to this Act should rest with the States. '47  Additionally,
section 1255 of SMCRA provides that state laws which are stricter
than those set forth by SMCRA are acceptable.48 If a state develops
its own regulatory program which meets certain requirements and
thereafter submits it to and gains the approval of the federal Secretary
of the Interior, that state gains "exclusive jurisdiction over the
regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations" within
its borders.49
43See id.
4430 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(l)-(2) (1977); see also 30 U.S.C. § 1271(e) (1977).
451d. (explaining that subject matter jurisdiction requires a sufficient amount in
controversy and diversity of citizenship).
'Bragg, 248 F.3d at 288; 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1977).
"730 U.S.C. § 1201 (0 (1977) (emphasis added).
4"See 30 U.S.C. § 1255 (1977).
0 30 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1977).
2002-2003]
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
Even though section 1270 gives federal courts jurisdiction to
hear private citizens' claims, 50 section 1253 gives the states
"exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation." 51 If a state does not
enforce its program properly, however, the Secretary of the Interior
can repeal the state's permit and repossess its power to regulate
surface mining.52 The United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia described the relationship between federal and state
governments three years after SMCRA's implementation in In re
Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation.53 The court stated,
"[A]fter an initial period of direct regulation by the Secretary, the Act
contemplates a continuing partnership between the states and the
federal government, with the Secretary providing oversight, advice,
and back-up authority, and the states bearing the major responsibility
for implementation of the Act.
54
Since the Act specifically states that citizens may bring
claims regarding SMCRA in federal court, it seems inconsistent that
the Bragg court decided that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
the case.55 It should be noted that section 1270 gives federal
jurisdiction to "the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution. 5 6  This creates a loophole in blanket federal
jurisdiction regarding SMCRA. According to the Eleventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution, "The Judicial power of
the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State., 57 Congress enacted the Eleventh Amendment 58 in response to
the 1793 case Chisholm v. Georgia,59 in which the United States
Supreme Court allowed a federal court to hear a case where a South
Carolina citizen sued the State of Georgia.60 In Hans v. Louisiana,6'
the Court disallowed an action in federal court where a citizen of a
62state brought it against that same state.
Nonetheless, exceptions to the sovereign immunity doctrine
have developed over years.63 One of the most important exceptions
'030 U.S.C. § 1270 (1977).
5"30 US.C. § 1253(a) (1977).
5230 U.S.C. § 1254 (1977).
"3653 F.2d 514 (1981).
541d. at 516.
SBragg, 248 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002).
"630 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(i)-(2) (1977).
57U.S. CONST. amend. XL.
581d.
'92 U.S. 419 (2 Dall.) (1973).
6°See id.
61134 U.S. 1 (1890).
2See id.63S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 2001).
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was set forth in Ex parte Young;64 it authorizes private citizens to
bring suit in federal court against the agent or officer of a state who
allegedly enforces a federal law illegally.65 However, because Ex
parte Young involved a federal question, the issue of whether a
citizen can bring suit against a state officer when state law is involved
was left open.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman
66
answered this question. Pennhurst involved an action brought by
Pennsylvania citizens and patients at the Pennhurst State School and
Hospital against the hospital and the Pennsylvania Department of
Public Welfare as well as the officials of both.67  The plaintiffs
alleged violations of both federal law and state law regarding the
standard of care they received at the hospital. 6' The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit decided the case on state law and never reached
the federal issue.69 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held
that when a claim of a citizen is brought against a state official in
federal court alleging a violation of state law, as authorized in Ex
parte Young, the sovereign immunity clause of the Eleventh
Amendment bars the claim.70 The Court reasoned, "It is difficult to
think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal
court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state
law.",71 In addition, the need to "vindicate the supreme authority of
federal law" is not at issue when state law is involved.72
Thus, the law seems clear-a claim against a state agent
acting in his official duty is barred from being decided in federal
court due to the doctrine of sovereign immunity if the claim rests on
state law. Applying this doctrine to Bragg, the ultimate question
goes to the nature of SMCRA.73 Is the statute that is allegedly being
violated state or federal law when the state has primacy? It is
necessary to look again to the statute to answer this question. Section
1270 explicitly gives jurisdiction over civil claims to the federal court
system. Although it seems clear that SMCRA is federal law,
section 1270 also states that it only applies if the Eleventh
Amendment allows such claims.75 That brings the issue back around
"209 U.S. 123 (1908).65See id.
"465 U.S. 89 (1984).671d at 92.6
9ld"
691d. at 95-96.
'0 Id. at 119. The Court also held that a claim against a state official involving state
law cannot be heard in federal court on the basis of pendant jurisdiction, id. at 121.7
Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106.
"Id. at 106.
"Bragg, 248 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002).
7430 U.S.C. § 1270(a)(I)-(2) (1977).
75id.
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to the long line of sovereign immunity cases and finally, to
Pennhurst. This problem is really just circular in nature-is West
Virginia's SMCRA program state or federal law?
IV, THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In Bragg, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit based its analysis on the Eleventh Amendment and relevant
case law.76 The defendant, the Director of Environmental Protection,
argued that state law was at issue.77 Therefore, under Pennhurst, the
doctrine of sovereign immunity would bar suit against the defendant
in federal court, regardless of the Ex parte Young doctrine. The
plaintiffs, Bragg and the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy,
argued (1) that Congress authorized suits in federal court under
section 1270 of SMCRA, (2) that the laws being enforced were really
federal laws because SMCRA provides that federal minimums must
be met and (3) that West Virginia submitted to federal jurisdiction
when it submitted a program for the Secretary's approval. 79 The
plaintiffs admitted that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was
relevant.80 However, they argued that under Ex parte Young, the
Eleventh Amendment allowed their claims and West Virginia waived
its immunity ri[hts.81 The court structured its analysis around these
two arguments.
The court never cited or interpreted section 127083 in its
analysis of the plaintiffs' first argument, although it admitted that it
must "return to the statutory structure of SMCRA and the methods by
which it employs a cooperative federalism. '84 Instead, the court
accepted the defendant's proposition that Pennhurst, not Ex parte
Young, applied because a state law claim was involved.85 This
determination that the action involved state, not federal, law was
based on the fact that West Virginia had primacy status.86 The court
looked to legislative intent to determine whether Congress intended
SMCRA to keep federal regulations after a state had obtained




8 Id. at 292.
"1Id. at 292.82See Bragg, 248 F.3d at 275.
3Recall that 30 U.S.C.§1270(a)(2) is the provision that allows citizen suits to be
heard in federal court.





primacy.8 7 Section 1253 of the Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to a
primacy state, and the court stated, "This federal policy of
encouraging 'exclusive' State regulation was careful and
deliberate. ' s  Just because a state does not always properly follow
federal minimum standards does not mean that it gives up exclusive
jurisdiction.8 9  Until the Secretary takes away the state's sole
regulation through the use of section 1254, the state is to enforce
minimum standards. 90
Therefore, when a State's program has been
approved by the Secretary of the Interior, we can
look only to State law on matters involving the
enforcement of the minimum national standards;
whereas, in matters relating to the good standing of
a State program, SMCRA remains directly
applicable. 9'
In response to the plaintiffs' argument that federal law was at
issue-because the laws the Director allegedly breached are federal
minimums and thus nondiscretionary-the court returned again to the
legislative intent of exclusive state regulation.92 To allow this suit in
federal court and force the Director to comply with the minimum
provisions would have taken away that exclusive regulation and
violated the legislative intent.93 The court discarded the plaintiffs'
argument that federal minimums are still federal law.94 It held that
state law was at issue,95 thus the Pennhurst rationale applied and the
suit was prohibited.96 Moreover, the West Virginia statute provided a
forum in state court for citizens' suits seeking to force the Director to
comply with the state Act.
97
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' argument that West
Virginia submitted to federal jurisdiction of citizen suits by taking
part in the program and proposing its own statute for the Secretary to
approve. 98 The rationale was simply that Congress did not clearly











9 ld. at 295-96.
9
ld. at 296,
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properly inform states that they were giving up jurisdiction of suits in
exchange for being able to present their own act to the Secretary of
the Interior.99  At that point in its reasoning, the court briefly
mentioned section 1270 of SMCRA. Reasoning that there was no
such jurisdictional warning in SMCRA, the court stated that, "the
citizen suit provision explicitly authorizes a compliance action
'against ... the appropriate State regulatory authority,' but only 'to
the extent permitted by the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the
Constitution."'' 00  Thus, the court interpreted section 1270 as
safeguarding sovereign immunity.' 0' The Fourth Circuit rejected
both of the plaintiffs' contentions that the suit should be heard in
federal court.02 Ultimately, the court dismissed the case without
prejudice so it could be brought again in West Virginia state court.'0 3
V. DISCUSSION
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Bragg is unsatisfactory in
that little attention was given to section 1270. The court only used
this provision to prove that Congress did consider sovereign
immunity when it enacted SMCRA. It did not look deeply into the
purpose of the section or at the legislative intent for giving federal
jurisdiction to citizens' suits. Although the plaintiffs' best argument
focused on the assertion that Congress meant for section 1270 to
authorize citizen suits against state officials in federal court,'04 the
court did not directly address the issue. Rather, it only addressed
section 1270 in the context of waiver of immunity. If Congress did
not intend for this suit and others like it to be heard in federal court,
then what is the purpose of this section? With regulatory power
given to the states, Congress must have known that a situation like
this would arise. The Fourth Circuit should have delved deeper into
this question. As it stands, the issue still lingers.
It is feasible to interpret section 1270 as authority for the
proposition that these types of suits may be heard in federal court. In
fact, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
stated,
Section [1270] of the SMCRA, in pertinent part,
confers jurisdiction on the federal district courts to












SMCRA against the United States or any other
government instrumentality or agency for violations
both of the SMCRA and of any rule, regulation,
order or permit issued pursuant thereto.' °5
The Third Circuit also reasoned that the intent of section 1270
was to make sure that regulatory agents abide by the Act.10 6 The
Fourth Circuit should have at least contemplated such reasoning.
Had the court rejected the rationale of the Third Circuit and the
plaintiffs' arguments by simply stating that the West Virginia Statute,
rather than compliance with SMCRA, was at issue in this case, the
court's decision would have been more thorough.
Regardless of the oversight, the outcome in Bragg remains
correct. First, it is difficult to evade Pennhurst. The Supreme Court
has clearly stated that there is no federal subject matter jurisdiction in
a suit against a state official involving state law. 0 7 State law was at
issue in Bragg because SMCRA specifically gives states exclusive
regulatory power after the Secretary of the Interior approves their
statutes. 10 8 The otily challenge left open to this line of reasoning is
the "jurisdiction" versus "regulation" problem. Although section
1253 provides primacy states with jurisdiction of regulation,'09 is that
really the same as the jurisdiction of section 1270?
Also, it is possible that the plaintiff brought this suit
incorrectly. Section 1271(a) of SMCRA allows citizens to complain
to the Secretary of the Interior about the way state officials conduct
their duties."o "Whenever, on the basis of any information available
to him, including receipt of information from any person, the
Secretary has reason to believe that any person is in violation of any
requirement of this chapter""' or that any state is not properly
enforcing a program, the Secretary must administer procedures to
correct the problem, including a federal investigation and
enforcement of surface mining permits, if necessary." 2  If the
plaintiffs had taken these measures, perhaps they would have
obtained immediate relief from the Secretary, assuming their
substantive allegations were correct.
Conceivably, the court felt political pressure from this case.
"We think the appeals panel went out of its way to find some means
'0sHaydo v. Amerikohl Mining, Inc., 830 F.2d 494, 496 (3d Cir. 1987).
-Id. at 496-97
11
7Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 124-25.
0830 U.S.C. § 1253 (1977).
'030 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (1977).
" d.
112 30 U.S.C. §1271 (a)-(b) (1977).
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to kick this out of federal court," stated a member of Earthjustice
Legal Defense Fund. 1 3  While the Fourth Circuit did make an
accurate decision based on precedent, it probably was pleased to
avoid the substantive issues. This case was, and is, of great political
importance in West Virginia. Recall the huge economic importance
of the coal industry in that state. "The coal industry has been, and
continues to be, big business in West Virginia."' 14 The court even
admitted to the political nature of the case in its opinion, stating that
"[t]he public concern over this issue is demonstrated by the
remarkably broad spectrum of interests represented in these
proceedings, as well as by their unusual alliances, in both the political
and legal arenas."115 Courts usually do not desire to contend with the
repercussions of ruling a certain way-to incite the environmentalists
and some of the citizens-or of ruling another way-only to upset
mining companies, the state's economic department, and other
citizens who depend on coal to survive.
Bragg may now bring her action in state court, but that is
probably not a desirable option. The plaintiffs' attorneys have said
that they do not wish to bring suit in state court because they fear a
preference for coal companies in the state court system.' 6 Though
the plaintiffs appealed their case to the United States Supreme Court,
petition for certiorari was denied in early 2002."17 Such a result is
unfortunate for Bragg. Due to Bush v. Gore,"' the Court might have
reached the substantive topic of whether the West Virginia Director
issued mining permits illegally. In Bush, the Court reviewed a
Florida Supreme Court decision about voting procedures for electing
the President of the United States; the Court felt a need to disallow
"arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate."" 19
Thus, there is a federal concern for how a state enforces its laws. The
United States Supreme Court might not have been as quick to rule for
the defendants as the Fourth Circuit since it is more removed from
the parties and the political nature of the case. However, as it
appears, the only remedy left for the plaintiffs must lie in state court.
VI. CONCLUSION
"3Francis X Clines, Panel Overturns Ruling Against Strip Mining, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2001, at A14.
"
4
Saffer, supra note 12, at 741.
"'Bragg, 248 F.3d 275, 285 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied
"
6
Clines, supra note 113, at A14.
.. Bragg v. W,Va. Coal Ass'n, 534 U.S. 1113 (2002).




The Fourth Circuit's ruling in Bragg creates a great division
in the state of West Virginia, as well as in its court system. Some
West Virginia citizens yearn to stop damage to the environment and
"the blockage and disappearance of Appalachian streams,"'120 while
others depend entirely on the coal industry and surface mining for
their livelihoods. The federal district court obviously thought that it
had jurisdiction over the controversy and sided with those concerned
with the environment. 12' The Fourth Circuit, however, found subject
matter jurisdiction lacking and ruled for those affected
economically. 1
22
Regardless of how this case ends, the political import will
deeply impact both sides. Those favoring the plaintiffs long to see a
cleaner, safer, more protected West Virginia. Those siding with the
defendants care about the economic welfare of a state so dependent
upon surface mining. It will be a waiting game to see who wins this
surface mining war.
...Clines, supra note 113, at A14.
121See Bragg v. Robertson, 72 F. Supp. 2d. 642 (S.D. W. Va. 1999).
'2See Bragg, 248 F.3d 275, 275 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. It 13 (2002).
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